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In this paper we take a close look at current interdisciplinary modeling practices in the environmental
sciences, and suggest that closer attention needs to be paid to the nature of scientiﬁc practices when
investigating and planning interdisciplinarity. While interdisciplinarity is often portrayed as a medium of
novel and transformative methodological work, current modeling strategies in the environmental sci-
ences are conservative, avoiding methodological conﬂict, while conﬁning interdisciplinary interactions to
a relatively small set of pre-existing modeling frameworks and strategies (a process we call crystalliza-
tion). We argue that such practices can be rationalized as responses in part to cognitive constraints which
restrict interdisciplinary work. We identify four salient integrative modeling strategies in environmental
sciences, and argue that this crystallization, while contradicting somewhat the novel goals many have for
interdisciplinarity, makes sense when considered in the light of common disciplinary practices and
cognitive constraints. These results provide cause to rethink in more concrete methodological terms
what interdisciplinarity amounts to, and what kinds of interdisciplinarity are obtainable in the envi-
ronmental sciences and elsewhere.
 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Interdisciplinarity (ID)1 has been called upon to address a wide
range of pressing environmental problems on the grounds that
social, economic, ecological and climate systems are causally
entwined. Solving these problems, it is thought, requires concep-
tually or methodologically integrated approaches from multiple
social and natural sciences, and may also require the participation
of extra-academic stakeholders (see Klein et al., 2012). There is thus
a strong policy interest in promoting and funding collaboration
among ecologists, economists, sociologists, civil engineers, atmo-
spheric scientists and many others working on environmental
problems. However, despite a large and still growing literature on
the subject of interdisciplinarity, it remains uncertain how inter-
disciplinary work between ﬁelds like these can be cognitively
structured in order to achieve gainful interdisciplinary responses to
resource management and other environmental problems.MacLeod), michiru.nagatsu@
he noun “interdisciplinarity”
M., & Nagatsu, M., What doe
, Studies in History and PhiloMuch current literature characterizes (and often deﬁnes)
“interdisciplinary” (ID) interactions as localized problem-driven
interactions which result in novel and transformative methodo-
logical and conceptual developments (see Huutoniemi, Klein,
Bruun, & Hukkinen, 2010 for an overview of how “inter-
disciplinarity” is understood in the literature). However, we will
show here that in the case of environmental sciences much cross-
border modeling is conservative, making use of pre-existing
methodological frameworks. Rather than exhibiting substantial
methodological innovation and diversiﬁcation, interdisciplinary
practices are crystallizing around four principal integrative meth-
odological platforms - each of which we describe here. Each has
various interdisciplinary affordances. These affordances help explain
the effectiveness of these frameworks in bridging the institutional
and cognitive constraints which generally inhibit interdisciplinarity
in the environmental sciences. We will argue that crystallization of
this kind is not a counter-intuitive phenomenon, however much it
might run counter to the normativemethodological assumptions or
expectations of interdisciplinarity scholars. It can be understood as
a rather natural attempt to build well-structured interdisciplinary
interactions around a limited set of manageable modeling frame-
works and strategies in a similar way to which participating ﬁeldss interdisciplinarity look like in practice: Mapping interdisciplinarity
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frameworks and strategies (see Humphreys, 2004).
These lessons from scientiﬁc practice suggest that there is cause
to be more cautious or more strategic about how interdisciplinarity
is managed and implemented, and what we can reasonably expect
from it.2 The current presumption that interdisciplinarity needs
highly problem-driven contexts requiring fundamentally novel
conceptual solutions and methodological approaches should be
weighed against our ﬁndings that the crystallizing strategies of
interdisciplinary practice are more consistent with traditional
models of scientiﬁc discovery. Such models favor incremental
development by building from well-established mathematical
frameworks, and adjusting concepts and methods at the outer
edges of ﬁelds. Such techniques avoid disruption to ﬁelds but put
them in a good position to develop solid cross-border collaboration
or integration now and in the future.
The paper proceeds as follows: the following section provides a
general background concerning increasing expectations of inter-
disciplinary research. Section 3 discusses a more speciﬁc context in
which interdisciplinary research is demanded in the environmental
sciences as a result of increasing interactions between natural and
social systems, which have traditionally been studied separately.
Section 4 offers our typology of emerging ID modeling strategies,
namely, data-driven modeling, modular model-coupling, integral
modeling, and substitutive model-coupling, drawing on our
ongoing case study. Section 5 draws several methodological lessons
for interdisciplinarity based on our ﬁndings, and more generally
argues for the importance of understanding scientiﬁc practice in
order to prescribe how to conduct interdisciplinary research. Sec-
tion 6 concludes by summarizing our argument.2. Expectations of interdisciplinarity (ID)
Over the last 20 years or so interdisciplinarity (ID) has been
widely discussed in science policy, science studies and education
science. Much of this discussion is strongly favorable towards ID,
seeing it as essential to resolving 21st century environmental, social
and health problems, while perceiving the institutional and
cognitive rigidity of established disciplines as obstacles to effec-
tively resolving such problems. New approaches are required, and
ID interactions (whether collaborative or otherwise) are seen as the
medium through which such approaches can be developed. As a
result, an important imperative has been placed on identifying
“genuine” ID interactions which achieve these goals, from those
that do not, particularly for research funding purposes (see
Huutoniemi et al., 2010).
However, agreeing on a deﬁnition of ID which can distinguish
genuine ID interactions from other kinds of cross border in-
teractions or exchanges, such as multidisciplinary or even imperi-
alistic (Mäki, 2013) ones, has proved difﬁcult. Indeed a major focus
of ID studies has been on taxonomizing different ways inter-
disciplinarity and multidisciplinarity can be conceptualized or
occur in practice (Klein, 2010). Scientists are by no means united
themselves on what they might mean by it (see Aboelela et al.,
2006). The broadest encompassing deﬁnitions do not take a
stance on what kinds of activities or interactions ID consists of.
Klein (1990, p. 196), for instance, gives the following general deﬁ-
nition: “Interdisciplinarity is a means of solving problems and2 Some sociologists are critical of the current policy discourses on inter-
disciplinarity based on their analyses of institutional dimensions of interdisci-
plinary research. See, e.g., Callard and Fitzgerald (2015) and Frickel, Albert and
Prainsack (2016). Our approach is distinctive from but complementary to this
literature.
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single methods or approaches.”
Within this many activities could be considered interdisci-
plinary. However, in recent years a predominant view has formed
around the expectation that genuine ID requires integration (see
Lattuca, 2003). That is, interdisciplinarity is,
a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or
addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with
adequately by a single discipline or profession. [by] draw[ing]
upon disciplinary perspectives and integrat[ing] their insights
through construction of a more comprehensive perspective.
(Klein & Newell, 1997, pp. 393-394)
The National Academy of Sciences (2006) gives a similar deﬁ-
nition, according to which interdisciplinarity is:
“a mode of research by teams or individuals that integrates in-
formation, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/
or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized
knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve
problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a single
discipline or ﬁeld of research practice.”
ID interactions are integrative to the extent that methodological
and conceptual frameworks or other disciplinary resources from
separate disciplines and ﬁelds are integrated in order to solve a
problem. In theory, integration serves to distinguish ID from mul-
tidisciplinarity. In multidisciplinary contexts researchers simply
break up a problem into parts recognizable as disciplinary prob-
lems, and go away and solve those parts separately without forging
any real connections between their approaches. Integration and
similar concepts are, however, often cashed out in the relevant
literature in term of metaphors rather than harder methodological
or conceptual criteria. Klein (2010) cites a range of “key descriptors”
applied to describe ID; “integrating”, “interacting”, “linking”,
“focusing” and “blending”.3 Other popular metaphors include
“boundary crossing” or “bridge building” or “bilingualism” (Repko,
Szostak, & Buchberger, 2016). Multidisciplinarity in contrast is
associated with phrases such as “juxtaposing”, “sequencing” or
“coordinating”. “Integration” itself however remains arguably
vague (although see O’Rourke, Crowley, and Gonnerman (2016) for
some philosophical attempt to clarify the concept using cases from
biology).
While many notions of ID treat integration as the crux of ID,
some concepts require more, often motivated by the strong
normative stances authors take towards ID, and what they expect
from it. Two additional requirements, or at least expectations, stand
out in this regard. The ﬁrst is that proper ID requires earnest at-
tempts to address real-world problems. The motivation for this
relates to the objectives many have for ID in the ﬁrst place, and/or
the conditions required for prompting integration. ID research or
problem-solving should be applied to outward-looking research
and problem-solving work, rather than being inwardly directed at
questions or problems framedwithin disciplinary contexts. Further,
real-world problem-solving contexts create the pressure for ID
interaction insofar as real-world problems cannot be reduced to
one discipline’s methods, concepts, etc. Such problems are complex
and cross disciplinary boundaries (Repko et al., 2016). Hence there
is an expectation that real-world problem-solving prompts or3 Another philosophically relevant dimension of ID concerns epistemic interde-
pendence between collaborators from different ﬁelds or disciplines and trust among
them (see e.g. Andersen, 2013).
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noting that these ideas that ID is or should be problem-driven ﬁts
common patterns of 3e5 year short-term funding schemes which
often form the basis by which ID is institutionally sponsored. Such
funding schemes require scientists and engineers to come together
in the context of applying for funding to solve a speciﬁc real world
problem, and provide a plan for an integrated solution over that
period.
The second additional criterion for ID is implicit in the concept
of a “comprehensive perspective” in Klein and Newell (1997, pp.
393e415) deﬁnition above. There is a common expectation that,
whatever integration entails, the result should be in some sense
novel and transformative for the ﬁelds involved, resulting in new
concepts and practices (Huutoniemi et al., 2010), or an overall more
holistic or systematic understanding of a set of phenomena or the
problems being addressed. One commonly stated implication is
that it is insufﬁcient to just piece together methods and concepts
from different ﬁelds without any novel practices emerging. If such a
requirement is used to help deﬁne integration for the purposes of
ID, then this creates a very high standard, which, as we will see, is
probably not often achieved in the environmental sciences, nor
elsewhere. The motivation for such a standard derives from the
supposedly disruptive aims of ID (see conceptions in particular of
“Mode 2” or “post-normal” science) and the envisioned need to
break up disciplinary structures and open up scientiﬁc disciplines
to other points of view (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Nowotny, Scott,
Gibbons, & Scott, 2001). But it is also an extension again of the idea
that disciplinary approaches are insufﬁcient for real-world prob-
lems even when jointly applied to a problem. Interactions in which
disciplinary practices and structures are not disrupted or reformed
are thus sometimes considered the hallmark of multidisciplinary
ones. Practitioners who are critical about the standard methodo-
logical framework of economics for instance tend to concur with
this view (e.g. Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010; Costanza et al., 2014).
Ecological economics is thus sometimes understood as an attempt
to create just such a genuinely ID approach.
It is somewhat difﬁcult to know whether these criteria are
considered actual requirements of true or proper ID, or simply
expectations of what integrative interactions will produce and in
what contexts this will happen. Either way, they both add a degree
of “normative baggage” to the discussions surrounding ID. We ﬁnd
both criteria are out of step with current scientiﬁc practice and do
not reﬂect how ID commonly occurs in the domain of model-
building in the environmental sciences, which are arguably inher-
ently interdisciplinary and oriented towards real-world problem-
solving. As we show in this paper, many interactions that are
otherwise integrative fail to produce novel methodological or
conceptual transformations. Our diagnosis is that these expecta-
tions surrounding ID are not well aligned with what is generally
feasible given the constraints under which scientiﬁc researchers
work, particularly in the context of short term grants. In fact, while
the institutional constraints inhibiting ID work (such as peer re-
view, tenure promotion and the like; see Jacobs & Frickel, 2009) are
well understood, cognitive constraints on ID research are not
(Brister, 2016; MacLeod, 2016).
In other contexts, MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016), and MacLeod
(2016) have analyzed the cognitive constraints affecting eco-
nomics/ecology interactions and engineer/molecular biologist in-
teractions in systems biology, arguing that these constraints should
not be underestimated. Cognitive constraints include, for instance,
different evidential standards and epistemic values, different
modeling and experimental practices, inconsistent concepts, and
the overall opacity of practices due to their complexity. Brister
(2016), in her own study of interactions between conservation bi-
ologists and anthropologists, identiﬁes similar constraints afﬂictingPlease cite this article in press as: MacLeod, M., & Nagatsu, M., What doe
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that disciplines often preclude productive ID interaction by framing
problems in terms of their own speciﬁc methodologies and speciﬁc
values. All of these restrict ID researchers from ﬁnding ways to
coordinate their practices, let alone to produce novel integrated
methodological or conceptual transformations.
Generally, the cognitive constraints confronting ID interactions
are at risk of trivialization when presented as “communication
problems” as they often are (Brister, 2016; MacLeod, 2016). These
constraints often arise out of deep epistemological disputes rooted
in the nature of practices within ﬁelds. One reason many of these
methodological differences in assumptions, concepts and values
are so hard to resolve is that they occur upstream in the problem-
solving systems upon which ﬁelds rely. Such systems have been
optimized over time to solve particular classes of problems. This
makes such differences difﬁcult to remove without requiring sub-
stantial, and often impractical changes elsewhere to these systems.
To build the case for a more nuanced practice-driven under-
standing of ID, we describe.
The current modeling strategies which are chosen in the envi-
ronmental sciences for ID modeling, and why they are chosen. In
particular, we evaluate interdisciplinary affordances and gains of
these modeling strategies. MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016) deﬁne
collaborative affordances as the features of a methodological strat-
egy which provide collaborators with means to overcome ID con-
straints and despite them coordinate and integrate their scientiﬁc
practices and scientiﬁc resources (model-building, experimenta-
tion, epistemic values and standards etc). However, ID in the
environmental sciences is not always collaborative. Some levels of
integration happen purely within one ﬁeld alone, when researchers
build models for instance that incorporate resources from a num-
ber of other ﬁelds. This happens in the environmental sciences to
some degree. Hence it’s worth assessing strategies generally in
terms of their overall interdisciplinary affordances, features which
facilitate integration in the face of constraints, which can include
affordances for collaboration.
This investigation reveals two important facts. First, relatively
few patterns of interaction dominate theways inwhichmodelers in
the environmental sciences choose to interact. These modes of
interaction are based on a limited set of modeling templates. Sec-
ond, the choice of thesemodes can be understood to some extent as
responses to cognitive constraints. That is, their interdisciplinary
affordances reside for the most part in their minimization of novel
methodological or conceptual invention. We will further discuss
implications of these ﬁndings on the conservative nature of ID
practices in Section 5.3. Nature-society interactions: ID in the environmental
sciences and its constraints
Before moving on to consider these patterns of interaction,
however, it is worthwhile giving some introduction to the back-
ground context and motivation for interdisciplinarity in the envi-
ronmental sciences. ID is seen by many as essential to modern
environmental science: contemporary environmental problems are
complex and the environmental, social or other demands we have
of solutions often diverse andmultifaceted. Such solutions arguably
reside outside the reach of classical disciplinary problem-solving
frameworks (DesRoches, Inkpen, & Green, forthcoming). Solutions
to these problems require understanding of both natural and social
systems, and how these systems interact (cf. Coupled Human and
Natural Systems, CHANS: Liu et al., 2007; the Anthropocene:s interdisciplinarity look like in practice: Mapping interdisciplinarity
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ogists, atmospheric scientists, sociologists, urban planners and
others ﬁnd themselves under pressure from funding agencies to
collaborate.
While it is impossible to develop an overall account of how
successful ID interactions have proved in the environmental sci-
ences, despite the funding and other institutional incentives
devoted to them, published studies indicate that it is not always
smooth sailing. Certainly collaboration has proved difﬁcult be-
tween mainstream economists and ecologists, and between quali-
tative social scientists and any quantitative environmental science
or engineering ﬁeld (see for instance Roy et al., 2013; Strang, 2009;
Brister, 2016; Fox et al., 2006). To obtain original data on
economics-ecology interactions, since 2014 we have conducted 14
semi-structured interviews with 13 individuals (6 economists, 5
ecologists and 2 sociologists) working in interdisciplinary projects
on forestry, ﬁsheries and water management, as well as on envi-
ronmental protection. We have additionally attended and recorded
4 research meetings in one bio-economic lab. From this data set,
together with other methodological articles written by ID practi-
tioners themselves, we have identiﬁed several important cognitive
constraints as major difﬁculties governing interactions between
economists and ecologists.5
In the ﬁrst place, for instance, economics and ecology build
models and design experiments at different temporal and spatial
scales which reﬂect the different scales at which important
ecological and economics phenomena occur and which are prac-
tical to study given each ﬁeld’s goals (Wätzold et al., 2006; Stevens,
Fraser, Mitchley, & Thomas, 2007). While economics focuses on
administrative-level equilibria useful for economic policy, ecolog-
ical experiments or observational studies tend to focus on much
smaller geographic areas which can be effectively controlled or
measured.6 Economics and ecology are also divided in terms of the
time scales at which they consider their respective systems can be
effectively studied. In economics equilibrium analysis typically pays
little or no attention to the speed of the process in response to
shocks for example, and the dynamics is assumed to operate over
short time scales (or no time at all). Ecological dynamics operate in
contrast over much longer time scales. Models built in economics
and ecology for both these reasons are commonly not in spatial or
temporal alignment. As Stevens et al. (2007) stress, scaling up ex-
periments in ecology is far from trivial for methodological and
practical reasons. Likewise building multiscale models which can
integratemodels built at different spatial or temporal scales raises a
wealth of its own methodological challenges, and remains partic-
ularly difﬁcult to do without large assumptions which weaken the
validity of the outcomes.
Further, as documented by Armsworth, Gaston, Hanley, and
Ruffell (2009),7 economists and ecologists differ highly over
various evidential standards and epistemic values, particularly over4 Ecological economics, which emphasizes the ﬁnite and unsubstitutable nature
of biosphere as capital, is a prominent interdisciplinary ﬁeld, but our focus includes
a wider range of ﬁelds that model interactions between natural and human systems
in the environmental sciences without any commitment to particular theories of
sustainability, such as a theory of steady-state economy.
5 All recordings except lab meetings have been transcribed into texts. For more
details about empirical data collected before 2016, see MacLeod and Nagatsu
(2016).
6 Scale misalignments between economics and ecology can take another form. A
salient example is economics focusing on a state level (trade deﬁcits etc.) while
climate change models concern global change.
7 This article appears in a special proﬁle of Journal of Applied Ecology on “inte-
grating ecology and the social sciences” (2009, volume 46, issue 2), which includes
several relevant discussions on economics-ecology integration (e.g., Lowe et al.,
2009).
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cording to them more theory-driven, ecologists more data-driven.
The goal of canonical economic research is to derive and test
theoretical models. The role of statistical regression in economics is
conﬁned to testing these models. These practices help “deﬁne” the
proper role of techniques like statistical regression within the ﬁeld.
Ecologists however will use data to generate models through sta-
tistical techniques, employing these models without deeper theo-
retical foundations.8 Economists employ data to test the validity of
their theoretical models and test for “off-model” relationships,
rather than using the data as a source of such relations. These
divergent modeling practices and standards, Armsworth et al.
(2009) report, can breed conﬂict and create obstacles to in-
teractions between ecologists and economists who may disagree
fundamentally over what are reliable and effective approaches for
solving a given environmental problem. Data-driven approaches in
ecology can be seen as unproductive and uninformative from an
economic point of view, whereas the commitment economists
display towards established theory and problem-solving frame-
works like constrained optimization (which ecologists readily
challenge) may be seen as narrow and limited. In general neo-
classical economic concepts and problem-solving frameworks can
seem too simplistic and unjustiﬁable outside economics.
While open-minded researchers can and do attempt to work
around these problems, some of the intransigence of these obsta-
cles stems from the centrality of these standards to the ﬁelds. Many
mathematical modeling templates and experimental techniques
have been designed around them, and as a result, the skills and
expertise economists and ecologists have, including the ability to
assess what counts as good or bad research, cannot be easily
reapplied under different sets of governing standards. Using pop-
ular terms in cognitive science and biology, researchers’ cognitive
tasks are scaffolded by basic conceptual and methodological re-
sources, which are heavily adapted to the problem-space of a given
ﬁeld. These cognitive scaffolds in turn affect what researchers see
as a problem and how to solve it. Such epistemic niches (Sterelny,
2010) are built around a set of epistemic standards or basic con-
ceptualizations of phenomena that are often at odds with those of
another ﬁeld. Sometimes such standards or fundamental concepts
may well be incommensurable and thus technically impossible to
bridge without large scale reformation of deeply embedded up-
stream principles (see Longino, 2013). For example, DesRoches
et al., (forthcoming) point out that historically entrenched ontol-
ogies of natural versus artiﬁcial (or anthropogenic) causal factors
reinforce “proper” domains of investigation for each ﬁeld and get in
the way of more unifying conceptualizations. Such ontological di-
vides can count strongly against any deep collaborative synthesis
between ecology and economics.
In addition, another fundamental difference, namely the dif-
ferences in non-epistemic value-orientation in different ﬁelds, may
give rise to incommensurable practices. For example, mainstream
environmental economics adopts anthropocentric views, while
ecological economics (and perhaps implicitly ecology too) adopts
biocentric views. This difference manifests itself in the different
extents to which natural capital is seen as substitutable with other
capitals, or the different methods and concepts bywhich ecosystem
services are valued (see Costanza et al., 2014). Even within social
sciences, which are broadly anthropocentric, economists’ one-
dimensional utility theory and sociologists’ more pluralistic views
can lead to incommensurable evaluations of net impacts of8 The tension between theory-driven and data-driven approaches sometimes
manifest itself also within economics, for example in the controversy over ‘mostly
harmless econometrics’ (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
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epistemic values are embedded in epistemic scientiﬁc practices (in
terms of concepts, models and methods), it is often difﬁcult to even
identify the exact nature of disagreements among practitioners.
In general, all these differences in modeling scales, epistemic
and non-epistemic values and standards, and ontological assump-
tions create entrenched conceptual and epistemological gaps be-
tween ﬁelds, which entrench both incompatible methodologies
and practices but also a degree of opacity.9 Opacity arises when the
dependencies of another ﬁeld on certain conceptual notions and
evidential standards and practices may be hard to identify, not to
mention justify, from outside the ﬁeld. This makes it hard for col-
laborators to ﬁgure out what kinds of alterations would be
considered reliable and productive for both parties, and practical
given the resources each ﬁeld has.
Having said all this, it is worth pointing out that the cognitive
gaps between economics and ecology, and among other environ-
mental science ﬁelds, are not always as substantial. For example
theory-driven approaches are common in physics or chemistry-
based environmental sciences such as atmospheric sciences and
hydrological sciences. The boundaries of those ﬁelds from one
another are a lot clearer, and less likely to be in conﬂict. Nonethe-
less scale problems do frequently arise to the extent that economic
models for instance generally lack the resolution and complexity of
models in many other natural environmental science ﬁelds like
hydrology (Voinov & Shugart, 2013). Furthermore, there are shared
gaps between quantitative environmental science ﬁelds and non-
mathematical social science approaches, particularly those from
sociology. Indeed the cognitive boundaries separating economics
and ecology are to some degree lower than those separating soci-
ologists from ecologists, as the former two share a “positivistic and
quantitative orientation” (Lowe, Whitman, & Phillipson, 2009, p.
301). Sociologists have had in general a hard time convincing
economists, ecologists and others of the viability of their inter-
pretive and qualitative, or purely statistical, approaches, and
ﬁnding ways to integrate these approaches with the mathematical
models quantitative environmental scientists tend to build.10 (See
4.1 in the next section as a strategy to solve this problem.)
While we do not want to give the impression that collaborations
in the environmental sciences, and particularly economics and
ecology are impossible, we do think that the breadth of the
cognitive constraints these researchers face have been under-
estimated in ID scholarship in general. Cognitive obstacles of
various forms are ever-present in ID work in the environmental
sciences, in addition to institutional ones. As such, any particular
strategy collaborators (or integrators) employ can be evaluated in
terms of the features it possesses which help facilitate.
Interdisciplinary interactions on a problem. We refer to these
features as interdisciplinary affordances. In the next section we look
at the dominant strategies environmental scientists are currently
employing, and analyze these strategies with respect to their
interdisciplinary affordances.9 Phenomenologists use the term transparency to describe how the agent sub-
jectively experiences well-entrenched external scaffolds (e.g. shoes or iphones) that
individualize her interactions with the world (Sterelny, 2010). A disciplinary sci-
entist may similarly experience her concepts and methods as well as material
scaffolds (e.g. microscopes or statistical packages) as transparent. To outsiders, this
implies opacity.
10 In one of the interviews with an ecologist working in an interdisciplinary
project involving ecologists, economists and other social scientists, he expressed
some frustration with social sciences claiming “there is nothing like truth” in social
science, in contrast to natural sciences. The interviewee complained that his
collaborating social scientists did not care about consistency between his mathe-
matical model and their written texts. (interview on 30 May 2014).
Please cite this article in press as: MacLeod, M., & Nagatsu, M., What doe
and its limits in the environmental sciences, Studies in History and Philo4. ID modeling strategies
Given the expectations many interdisciplinarity scholars have
about ID, it may come as some surprise how limited it oftenmay be.
Analysis of our interviews with scientists, as well as the literature
by participants themselves of practices within this context, reveal
that the majority of modeling strategies can be grouped into four
main categories: data-driven modeling, modular model coupling,
integral modeling, and substitutive modeling.11 These strategies are
all integrative in one sense or another. In other words, these stra-
tegies jointly provide a more concrete meaning to the term ‘inte-
gration’ which is often unanalyzed in the ID literature.
4.1. Data-driven modeling strategies
Interdisciplinary data-driven strategies employ a statistical
modeling platform like multiple regression analysis or other kinds
of statistical inferential processes to construct relations between
variables. Different ﬁelds contribute their own individual data sets,
and the chosen data analysis method enables connections to be
made between variables which are not all normally measured, or
capable of being measured, within a single ﬁeld. Some forms of
Bayesian network analysis can be useful in this context. Different
collaborators can contribute a set of variables to help build a map of
causal dependencies relevant to a given management problem and
a set of priors governing the relations. These relations can then be
updated based on the data the collaborators provide. Bayesian
analysis relies on initial estimations of the relations between vari-
ables, which can be theoretically derived from the ﬁelds involved
(using a model for instance), but in principle Bayesian analysis is
neutral with respect to where that information comes from or how
it is derived (e.g., see Haapasaari & Karjalainen, 2010 for the use of
expert knowledge). The Bayesian process ultimately estimates the
relationship through iterations using the available data.
The fact that these methods need involve fewmethodological or
theoretical commitments from the participants or any deeper more
domain-speciﬁc modeling procedures and methods enables rela-
tively straightforward interdisciplinary interaction. Researchers
can bring their data, sets of variables, and in the case of Bayesian
network modeling, background expectations to the table. One
beneﬁt is that non-mathematical researchers like sociologists have
a reasonable opportunity to contribute their data to such modeling
frameworks (Haapasaari, Kulmala, & Kuikka, 2012). Overall these
kinds of strategies have rather high interdisciplinary (more spe-
ciﬁcally collaborative) affordances and produce a collectively con-
structed model which does not need to prefer one ﬁeld’s method or
theory over another (although of course there is a positivistic bias
to such an approach). Alternatively, of course, the theoretically and
methodologically shallow aspects of these kinds of schemes may
not be acceptable to everyone involved as we noted in the case of
regression analysis above (Armsworth et al., 2009). Consider one
case study for instance on the application of a Bayesian Belief
Network analysis, which was employed to analyze management
scenarios for Baltic salmon ﬁsheries. Haapasaari et al. (2012, p. 5)
report that the economists “did not believe in the possibilities of
Bayesian belief networks in dynamic optimization” and instead
opted for a more traditional model of natural resource economics.11 For this framework we have relied partially on Voinov and Shugart (2013),
particularly for the concept of integral modeling, although we have expanded on
the class of models they refer to as integrated. Kelly et al. (2013), through an
exhaustive study, distinguish ﬁve “modeling approaches” currently used in inte-
grated environmental assessment and management. Since our interest is specif-
ically how different strategies handle cognitive constraints, rather than models or
mathematical types, our categorization tends to cross-cut theirs.
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2015) rather attributed the problem to a large cognitive gap rather
than conﬂict of belief or epistemic value, suggesting that the
problem was due to the difﬁculty of making a particular discrete
Bayesian model using a particular software compatible with dy-
namic optimization within the time-frame of a PhD project. Either
way aligning the two approaches can be very difﬁcult. Economists
typically measure proﬁt or utility (based on individual preferences)
as the only criterion, and identify a policy measure that maximizes
proﬁt or utility under given constraints. In contrast, the Bayesian
Belief Network analysis typically adopts scenario-based decision
analysis, using heterogeneous utility concepts (such as economic,
social, recreational, and ecological utilities) and weighing them
against each other on a case-by-case basis.12 Given the centrality of
utility maximization in economics (and its commitment to
normative individualism as the principle of anthropocentric valu-
ation), weighing it against other kinds of utility, whose origins are
opaque, may seem arbitrary and unjustiﬁed.13 In sum, while data-
driven modeling strategies have high collaborative affordances,
providing a framework for integrating information from disparate
ﬁelds, their theoretical neutrality and openness to multiple per-
spectives can be an obstacle.
4.2. Integral modeling
Integral modeling (a term we borrow from Voinov & Shugart,
2013) employs a particular domain-neutral modeling framework
to combine information from different ﬁelds. By domain-neutral,
we mean that these modeling structures are similar to data-
driven practices, providing a schema or template for relating any
variables (whatever their disciplinary origin) in complex systems
and underlying methodologies for analyzing those models. We
include here for instance agent-based models (ABM) and system
dynamics models (SD). Both are employed in the environmental
sciences as a means to integrate different ﬁelds. We concentrate
here on SD models. System dynamics modeling has for instance
long played a prominent role in ID and environmental science
scholarship by being consistently seen to embody the kind of
methodological structure and philosophical attitudes required to
capture complex environmental interactions which cross disci-
plinary boundaries.14 Generally system dynamics models relate
variables through sets of coupled differential equations. These
equation represent what are commonly referred to in the envi-
ronmental sciences as stock-ﬂow relationships, i.e. both the quan-
tity of a given stock and its ﬂow or rate of change at a given point in
time. Such models track the movement of stocks (resources)
around a system. Importantly system dynamics models can easily
build in complex interactions between variables (in ways not
necessarily available in modular model-coupling cases (see 4.3)),
such as feedback relations and time-scale variances (although
spatial variables rarely feature). Not only do modelers provide12 Only 2 out of 15 publications assigned to the category of “Bayesian Networks” in
Kelly et al. (2013, pp. 166-7) adopt optimization of a single objective function in
addition to scenario-based analysis.
13 In fact, multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), such as multi-attribute utility
theory, is increasingly popular in environmental sciences (see Huang, Keisler, &
Linkov, 2011 for a review), and applied environmental economists may be more
open-minded than we suggest here. However, as one economics PhD student we
interviewed (on 3rd June 2016) informed us, mastering sophisticated constrained
optimization is a full-time PhD job, which naturally makes early-career economists
reluctant to engage with alternative methods such as scenario analysis given the
time constraints.
14 In fact system dynamics is often seen to embody the required attitudes for being
interdisciplinary, given its common interpretation as a non-reductionistic meth-
odology (see Farrell, Luzzati, & Van den Hove, 2013).
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provide models governing the relationships between those
variables.
As with the other cases, these integral modeling strategies
provide particular interdisciplinary affordances, handling certain
cognitive obstacles well. Issues of model and methodological
compatibility are avoided, since a common modeling platform is
used, although unlike the case of data-driven modeling, a causal-
mechanistic model is the outcome, which can serve to provide
richer insight into the phenomena in question. The methodological
standards to be applied to parametrize, validate and analyze the
model are driven to a certain extent by the modeling paradigm,
avoiding potential methodological conﬂicts, at least amongst those
who sign up to participate on building such models.
This all said, integral models (e.g. system dynamics or agent-
based models) do not currently serve as platforms for collabora-
tive interaction, though they serve as platforms for integration.15
Their collaborative affordances seem limited. We speculate on
some of the reasons here. Most models seem to be generated
within a single ﬁeld, which borrows variables and data from other
ﬁelds and models elements to describe interactions between vari-
ables. As a result, there are likely disciplinary biases and standards
built into such models which restrict their ability to prove credible
or informative outside their discipline. The difﬁculty of performing
such an integration over a wide range of ﬁelds may in fact help
explain why these models are usually constructed within a ﬁeld.
Doing so avoids need to standardize complex independently
developed models so that they are interpretable within one soft-
ware language, the challenge modular-model coupling faces (4.3
below). Yet lack of actual collaboration, and indeed computational
limits, restricts the detail and complexity of the representations of
interactions between variables modelers bring into SD or AB
models from outside their ﬁeld. This might well serve to make such
models seem less credible and useful to outsiders, and only credible
to insiders who believe strongly in the ability of systems dynamics
and agent-based models, though relatively simple interactions, to
represent and account for complex emergent behavior.16 As Kelly
et al. (2013) observe, SD models are mostly limited to analyzing
coarse scale trends, which may not always seem useful or valuable
to outsiders.17 Integral modeling thus creates its own obstacles to
ID collaboration, even if it can to some extent serve as a platform of
ID integration.4.3. Modular model-coupling
Modular-Model Coupling18 is perhaps the predominant form of
integrative modeling used currently in the environmental sciences,
and represents a highly canonical form of interdisciplinary
modeling. In this strategy each discipline provides a model to be15 According to Voinov and Shugart (2013) most ABM and SD models are currently
built in-house. This is borne out through a close examination of the list of publi-
cations assigned to those categories by Kelly et al. (2013). Furthermore, ABM and SD
models have been used restrictively so far, ABM models principally in land-
management, and SD models in water-management.
16 Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2007), for example, argue that economists do not use
agent-based models because these models do not ﬁt their ideal of understanding,
which is based on analytic derivation through equilibrium analysis.
17 A coarse-grained mechanistic understanding is useful for the intuitive under-
standing of the general system in question, and for communicating its character-
istics to stakeholders, rather than for providing speciﬁc predictions about the
behavior of particular systems in particular times and locations.
18 It is also called coupled-component modeling by Kelly et al. (2013) and plain
“integrative” modeling by Voinov and Shugart (2013). We prefer “modular-model”
coupling to emphasize the degree of modularity of modeling components pre-
served in these modeling strategies.
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models serve as input to other component models. These models
feed relevant information to one another. The resulting system is
calibrated to meet the constraints of a problem and the available
data. For example, Strasser et al. (2014) report on developing a
large-scale integrated model to assess the effects of climate change
on the economic viability of skiing resorts in the Austrian Alps. The
integrated models combine a climate model, estimating future
climate change, and a snow cover evolution model drawing on the
climate changemodel to estimate future technical snow production
requirements and its efﬁciency, water and energy consumption.
Additionally the snow production model feeds information to an
economic model analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of snow pro-
duction, and a tourismmodel, modeling regional tourism structure,
for policy analysis. Both of these latter models also feed information
to one another. Building each of these models and integrating them
required an interdisciplinary team of climate scientists, snow hy-
drologists, economists, tourism researchers and stakeholders.
For the most part researchers building such models generally
contribute what are commonly called “legacy” models (Voinov &
Shugart, 2013) to model-coupling projects, and rely on estab-
lished methodologies associated with such models in order to
apply them to speciﬁc scenarios; hence the modularity of this
approach. This does notmean however that suchmodels are simply
plugged together. Getting models from different ﬁelds to operate
together requires substantial integrative processes, as Strasser et al.
(2014) emphasize, including the selection of appropriate inter-
facing tools, which can link models often formulated in different
computational languages, the selection of mathematical methods
to link models of different spatial or temporal scale, and agreement
upon epistemic and other values for deriving and measuring model
outcomes in order to address the management problem. While this
is often difﬁcult work, a critical affordance of modular model-
coupling comes from the degree to which established disciplinary
practices are nonetheless preserved. Individual disciplinary re-
searchers remain responsible for their components, and for
assessing the reliability, theoretical value and other standards of
the components they provide. The substantial work of building new
models, which somehow integrate methods and concepts from the
background ﬁelds, is thus avoided, and the main work is the
boundary work of re-applying and connecting pre-existing
models.19
The gain of such collaborative endeavours can be quite signiﬁ-
cant, in terms of what interdisciplinarity can bring to a problem.
Instead of modelers having to make strong assumptions or sim-
pliﬁcations about systems or processes that lie outside their
expertise, theoretically well-motivated and established models can
be provided, which have greater robustness, and thus allow, say,
optimization or scenario-based management strategies to explore
relationships and sensitivity amongst a large range of environ-
mentally signiﬁcant variables.
More reliably and with more theoretical depth than data-driven
and integral methods can achieve. On the other hand, there are
trade-offs, as Voinov and Shugart (2013) report. While data-driven
and integral modeling may to some extent side-step scale issues
and the domain-speciﬁc theoretical and methodological de-
pendencies of most models, modular model-coupling often runs
hard up against both. Contributed models are generally designed
for goals and scales speciﬁc to the ﬁelds they originate from, and19 This requires distinct software development expertise, which is not necessarily
related to any substantial ﬁelds. See, e.g., Brown et al. (2014) for software-related
issues discussed in agricultural science, in which multiple software platforms are
developed to connect crop genetics models, soil models, etc.
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et al., 2013). Reapplying them to problems outside their design
speciﬁcations may push them outside their proper range of validity.
Handling scale problems is usually most easily addressed through
aggregation and averaging procedures which introduce error, and
tend to ignore the possibilities of feedback. Further combining
complex models can lead to an even more complex integrated
model, which is extremely difﬁcult to calibrate and to interpret.
Voinov and Shugart (2013, p. 151) refer to such constructions as
“integronsters”, which are “perfectly valid as software products but
ugly and useless as models”. Such modeling strategies may tech-
nically give answers to overriding problems, but provide very little
means for understanding the causes governing the solution, and
thus for generating general theoretical principles or insight into
these solutions.
4.4. Substitutive model-coupling
The last category is the least observed of those above, but
perhaps the most interesting from an interdisciplinary point of
view. Substitutive model-coupling occurs when two ﬁelds share
model templates of roughly similar structure for solving given
classes of problems, but use simpliﬁed methods and representa-
tions for components of those templates, which another ﬁeld can
handle with much more sophistication. We have studied closely
interactions between ecologists and economists addressing
renewable natural resource management problems. Ecologists and
economists have long employed similar modeling frameworks to
handle these problems. The frameworks composed by each contain
a biological growth model component and an economic optimiza-
tion component. The growth model is traditionally represented in
economics using simpliﬁed, non-mechanistic biomass representa-
tions of the resource (like tree or ﬁsh stocks) and its growth rates.
Ecologists can employ much more sophisticated representations,
such as process-based models, which capture a range of variables
which affect growth. On the other hand ecologists use what
economists would consider unreﬂective optimization criteria, with
a history of relying onmaximum sustained yield (MSY), without any
considerations of economic variables like costs and prices, as well
as discounting of future value. Economists instead use as a man-
agement goal the maximum economic yield (MEY), i.e., net present
value of a given stock taking costs and prices into account (see
Binkley, 1987 for forestry; Grafton, Kompas, & Hilborn, 2007 for
ﬁshery). As such, these modeling frameworks can be integrated by
swapping out unsophisticated components for the more sophisti-
cated ones collaborators can provide.
This strategy has proven so far to be a very useful collaborative
platform. The strategy can leverage off pre-existing relations be-
tween variables to join components, with those variables (like
population numbers) already playing the role of linking compo-
nents in the original disciplinary modeling frameworks. Since for
the most part the components are already in spatial and temporal
alignment within the existing frameworks, scale problems do not
arise. Furthermore model construction tasks largely remain within
the domain of each ﬁeld, and thus under governance of their own
methods and standards. Since the modeling components are well-
integrated and relationships clear, feedback between components
can be used to help better design components using information
from across disciplinary boundaries. MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016),
for instance, report a case in which the economic optimization al-
gorithms were able to ﬁnd errors in the underlying growth model
(discontinuities for instance), which were sent back to the ecolo-
gists and ultimately used to correct and improve the growthmodel.
Naturally, however, while such an approach has quite clear
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namely the existence of homologous modeling frameworks. These
are likely to be uncommon, although perhaps not so rare given
histories of model sharing, and the overall ﬁnite set of mathemat-
ical systems in operation in science, according to Humphreys
(2004). In addition, ﬁeld-speciﬁc factors may complicate the
judgement about which models are more naive and thus should be
substituted. For example, ﬁsheries science has a long history of
using MSY as the management objective for various reasons (see
Smith and Punt 2001) and it is still being used as the EU ﬁshery
policy objectives for example, and economists have yet to convince
ﬁsheries scientists and policy makers to switch toMEY (see Grafton
et al., 2007 as a recent attempt).20 These ﬁeld-speciﬁc factors
include non-cognitive obstacles including differences in values and
institutions, and cannot be resolved through successful integrative
modeling alone.5. Lessons for interdisciplinarity: crystallization and the
importance of understanding scientiﬁc practice
The strategies we have discussed above have several important
characteristics with ramiﬁcations for discussions and normative
expectations of interdisciplinarity in the environmental sciences
and beyond. In the ﬁrst place, analyzing ID practices in terms of
strategies like these provides a more concrete methodological un-
derstanding of what ID is or how it manifests itself in a given
concrete research context. ID scholars have had a tendency to
discuss ID in metaphorical terms, describing it as a process of
learning “languages” and understanding different “cultures”; ID is a
matter of “communication”, “boundary-crossing”, and so on.
Arguably the lack of engagement with scientiﬁc practices conﬁnes
these discussions to rather ﬁgurative talk. Our analysis of practices
in the environmental sciences, however, shows that there are at
present concrete methodological and more technical meanings to
be given to “interdisciplinarity” in the form for instance of these
modeling frameworks. Given the highly interdisciplinary and
problem-oriented nature of the environmental sciences, we
conjecture that our results are generalizable to some extent. In
particular, we conjecture that similar ID methodological practices
may be identiﬁed in other ID ﬁelds, and that the actual methodo-
logical structures we extracted in our case may be used as tem-
plates for structuring ID research elsewhere.
Secondly, while ID discussions have focused on the institutional
constraints facing ID research in terms of discipline-centered
reward systems and organizational structures (both giving in-
dividuals disincentives for ID research), our analysis above in-
dicates how important cognitive constraints can be in shaping ID
practices. While not all of these strategies could be used to handle
any type of problem, none of these modeling strategies we have
identiﬁed above are arbitrary with respect to cognitive constraints,
but provide speciﬁc avenues for dealing with at least a subset of
them. Modular model-coupling and substitutive model-coupling
for instance are strategies which aim to build models collabora-
tively while preserving disciplinary modeling standards and
methods. The prevalence of modular model-coupling in practice
can certainly be explained by the difﬁculties of achieving integra-
tion when relatively heterogeneous theoretical frameworks are
involved. At the same time, these choices mean that researchers
often have to confront constraints that are not handled up front
during the interaction process such as scale and other compatibility20 In contrast, in forestry MEY seems to be more accepted. In fact, Martin Faust-
mann, the ﬁrst person who proposed the use of MEY as the management objective
in 1894, was a forester.
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hand, avoid the difﬁculties of resolving methodological or theo-
retical conﬂicts by minimizing the required roles background
disciplinary methods and theories play in model construction. As
such they have some capacity to bypass scale issues or other issues
of model incompatibility. In addition, reliance on little substantive
disciplinary theory andmethod in the case of data-drivenmodeling
opens the door for inclusive collaboration with, say, non-
mathematical researchers, but potentially at a cost of excluding
more theory-driven researchers. Reliance on a single integral
modeling framework like SD has similar pros and cons. Analyses
such as the one we provide here help show how cognitive con-
straints shape ID practices in concrete methodological terms.
Thirdly, these modeling frameworks can be understood as
essentially conservative responses to the need amongst researchers
and their funders for ID research. This conservativeness as
mentioned at the start (in Sections 1 and 2) challenges the common
expectation that ID problem-solving contexts will drive novel and
transformative methodological and conceptual development. For
the most part these frameworks either attempt to preserve meth-
odological practices and conceptual frameworks by using estab-
lished frameworks, or provide more neutral approaches which
avoid substantive methodological or conceptual change and can be
engaged in somewhat casually.
As a result, in the case of modeling in the environmental sci-
ences, at least - if we factor out novel ﬁelds like ecological eco-
nomics - we are seeing the crystallization of interdisciplinary
practices around a limited set of conservative model building
frameworks or strategies, instead of novelty and transformation.
Hence, while ID studies promote a vision of interdisciplinarity as
relatively ﬂuid and inventive, the existence of this limited set of
strategies, strongly weighted towards handling cognitive con-
straints in a conservativemanner, points to the opposite. Normative
expectations of what ID should be are not being met, even in an
area like the environmental sciences, for which interdisciplinarity
is increasingly accepted as good practice at an institutional level,
and accordingly well-funded.
ID scholars may respond to this, as they often do, by declaring
that many of the frameworks given above are not in fact cases of
interdisciplinarity but instead cases of multidisciplinarity because
such methods are not all truly integrative but represent more of an
assembly of approaches which divide problems along disciplinary
lines. For example, the model-coupling case may perhaps be
considered just cases of “juxtaposing”, “sequencing” or “coordi-
nating”, metaphors associated with multidisciplinarity. However as
suggested above coupled models are not simply juxtaposed or co-
ordinated, if we apply any straightforward meaning of those terms.
ID work and agreement is required to build systems of models
which work together effectively. Data-driven and integral ap-
proaches do combine variables and data from different ﬁelds into
single models. Further, as MacLeod and Nagatsu (2016) point out,
substitutive model-coupling arguably does result in a new product
(a new modeling framework), and substantive levels of ongoing
interactionwhich could not have emerged otherwise, such as using
models from different ﬁelds to correct each other, even if this
framework is built from very familiar model components and
methods. Given these ﬁndings, we suggest that it is a better con-
ceptual account-keeping to unpack the multi-dimensional notion
of ‘integration’ in terms of actual methodological practices, than to
insist that the notion be reserved for empirically unmotivated ideal
notions of what interdisciplinarity is expected to be.
These conceptual issues aside, we think there are methodolog-
ical rationales that drive crystallization, rather than transformation,
in ID integrative modeling practices. These rationales are an
extension of those applied in common disciplinary modelings interdisciplinarity look like in practice: Mapping interdisciplinarity
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sciences. Humphreys (2004, chapter 4), for instance, argues for the
centrality of limited sets of what he calls computational templates
within scientiﬁc ﬁelds and disciplines.21 These templates are basic
mathematical representational structures which are computa-
tionally tractable. One central aspect of disciplinary practice is the
development and application of these templates, including the
development of experimental methodologies and the production of
data sets, etc., which can apply them, and mathematical investi-
gation which can enrich the properties of these templates (some-
times called horizontal modeling). Such activities readily make
sense from a cognitive perspective: restricting the methodology of
a ﬁeld to the development of a set of templates allows the devel-
opment of standardized practices, and provides constraints which
reduce the problem-solving choices researchers are confronted
with.
Our idea of modeling framework is less concrete than Hum-
phreys’ notion of computational template. Frameworks, as we have
described them here, exist at a more abstract level, prescribing
models of interaction rather than the speciﬁc mathematical forms
Humphreys has in mind. Nonetheless, given the complexity of ID
problems in the environmental sciences and elsewhere, and the
cognitive and institutional constraints scientists have to deal with,
it is quite rational for them to pursue a similar kind of strategy with
respect to ID research too, that is, a strategy which concentrates on
the development of a ﬁnite set of modeling frameworks. Experi-
ences from doing so can be collected, and methodologies devel-
oped to help standardize them and enrich them over time. Overall
they have the ability to promote longer term collaborative or
interdisciplinary methodological development, in a way that
perhaps ad hoc ID interaction on a single problem cannot.
One of the putative strengths of substitutive model-coupling is
in fact the degree to which it mirrors disciplinary practices and
helps provide a foundation for solid collaborative methodological
development and investigation. The cases we have observed
combine pre-existing modeling frameworks, and at the same time
move from relatively simple cases to more complex ones through
step-by-step development, as in forest management models taking
into account a non-clearcut regime (Tahvonen & Rämö, 2016),
bioenergy and carbon storage (Pihlainen, Tahvonen, & Niinimäki,
2014; Tahvonen & Rautiainen, 2017), or reindeer management
models taking into account government subsidies (Pekkarinen,
Kumpula, & Tahvonen, 2015). Substitutive model-coupling offers
a platform for building frameworks equivalent to something like
Humphreys’ templates, although templates devoted to collabora-
tive interdisciplinary work rather than disciplinary work. Some-
thing similar is hoped with integral frameworks like systems
dynamics. The original models produced in such frameworks over a
longer term can be carefully scaled-up in complexity through back
and forth interaction to consider more variables, andmore complex
relations.
This crystallization of practices of course serves to further
crystallize at least for the present established disciplinary practices
in ID work. The reliance on background practices and avoidance of
methodological change is itself rationalizable on cognitive grounds
given the domain speciﬁcity of practices and difﬁculties of over-
coming cognitive and other constraints. But there is also another21 In philosophy of science concerning interdisciplinarity, Knuuttila and Loettgers
(2014) use the term ‘model templates.’ Their focus is however on the general
syntactic nature of these templates in facilitating ID transfer or exchange, where
one template is applied in different discipline(s) than where it originated. ID in this
sense is a very limited and special case that has been observed in history and
philosophy of science (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2016).
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expect that innovation within disciplines occurs for the most part
principally at the boundaries of disciplines, to prevent radical
reformation (par Lakatos (1970) ideas of a protective belt), so it
should be expected in ID contexts as well. That is, just as re-
searchers commonly seek out modiﬁcations consistent with
establishedmethods and practices within disciplines,22 researchers
in interdisciplinary contexts are expected to do the same. In this
respect ID practices recapitulate ordinary rational disciplinary
practices.
This mirroring of disciplinary strategy has consequences not
only for expectations about what ID looks like and what it can
achieve, but also for the most effective ways to implement it. In
particular, it raises a question about whether real-world problem
contexts themselves are always appropriate contexts for ID work. If
certain methodological platforms are seen as important poles of ID
work in general, then there is arguably an interest in funding more
theoretical research on these, such as research onmodel calibration
for coupled-model systems. This methodological development is
indeed already apparent in the environmental sciences themselves.
Computational methods are being devised to help standardize and
integrate models for coupling and calibration (Voinov & Cerco,
2010). Likewise, the typical 3-5 year funding schema seems out of
step with the more cumulative nature of these practices, which, as
within disciplines, require time to assemble and perfect. Addi-
tionally, the modeling frameworks identiﬁed above can represent
sound and accepted strategies of ID integration for the purposes of
making funding decisions. Funding applications are often promis-
sory or vague about their plans for integration, leading to project
results that do not meet any standard of integration. However
choosing a well-accepted ID modeling strategy such as those above
can help signal to funders both the seriousness of the intention to
interact and a methodological pathway for doing so, enabling ID
funding decisions which are much less speculative, or which resort
to disciplinary criteria for sake of having no other. Further these
modeling strategies require concrete sets of knowledge, techniques
and skills to operate which can be used explicitly to train envi-
ronmental scientists in interdisciplinary work.
To summarize, expectations of how ID can and should occur
within the environmental sciences and elsewhere, we suggest, may
not be well-aligned with a deeper understanding of how scientiﬁc
practice operates, and in turn how ID can develop substantively and
sustainably (i.e. continuously over the longer term). If this is true,
then it does raise concerns about whether current ID scholarship
has unrealistically high expectations about epistemic and practical
gains from ID research. However, our study does not imply that we
should simply lower expectations from ID research or drop it from
science policy priorities. ID is recognized by practitioners them-
selves as a desirable goal, and some ID practices are yielding
genuine gains. Nonetheless, both research policy and education
science could do better by taking more account of the bottom-up
systems scientists are themselves constructing to govern their ID
interactions, and by helping advance those practices towards policy
goals through sound educational practices and funding policies.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have identiﬁed four interdisciplinary modeling
strategies in the environmental sciences, drawing on our past and
ongoing case studies, as well as a review of the methodological
literature in environmental sciences. We discussed the affordances22 Developments of modiﬁed models of choice in behavioral economics serve as
perfect examples of this practice.
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a useful analytic framework to rationally reconstruct existing
integrative ID modeling practices. Our typology is informed by
practice, but at the same time motivated by our wish to provide
theoretical-methodological insights to ID discussions by drawing
on the philosophy of science. We have challenged the reliance of
the dominant ID discourse on metaphors in analyzing ID practices,
and criticized certain normative expectations in the ID Studies
literature as out-of-step with actual ID modeling practices. The
accumulation of substantial ID work and ultimately the crystalli-
zation of certain practices in the environmental sciences and
elsewhere in the last decade offer an opportunity to develop more
careful theoretical analysis of what ID is in practice, the constraints
under which it operates, what can be expected of it now and in the
future, and how policy can affect its future development.Acknowledgements
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